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Abstract:   Workers’ reciprocity in a simple gift exchange game has been demonstrated in prior 
research to be a problem of enforcement. This paper showed that potential future 
interactions could not motivate the workers significantly because of assurance problems. 
Lack of information about employers’ relative reciprocal type made workers reluctant to 
cooperate. Three experimental treatments were conducted to investigate effort patterns. 
The design was replicated from the paper Kean Siang et al (2010). It was found that 
workers’ efforts, between those with and without repetition effect, were not significantly 
different. Workers did not cooperate much even when there was enforcement. The low 
effort problem was overcome when workers were able to judge the relative reciprocal 
type of the employer by comparing the current wage with the average wage. It was 
found that workers responded better to average wages than to current wages, and were 
significantly more cooperative. 
I. InTroducTIon
Generally the gift exchange game exhibits the characteristic of cooperation between employer 
and worker. The important feature of the game is the reciprocal type of the partner. There has 
been considerable research on repeated interaction, which assumes that future interaction enforces 
current effort (see for example in Gächter and Falk (2000), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Fehr 
at al. (1997), Fehr et al. (1993), Simon and Fehr (2000)). The lack of enforcement, however, 
is not the only potential source of low cooperation in a gift exchange game. The worker will 
have an incentive to work harder if he is guaranteed that his efforts will be reciprocated. An 
environment with cooperation incentive but without guarantee is said to exhibit assurance 
problems (Issac et al. 1989).
The lack of information about the other partner’s reciprocity discourages cooperation. 
When deciding on their effort level, workers face two important concerns: on one hand, if 
the employer imitates reciprocity strategically by increasing wages marginally to induce 
cooperation, workers will experience low profits; conversely, minimal effort levels induce 
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low wage levels from the employer. Therefore, if the employee does not know the relative 
performance of employer, it is not assured that employer will reciprocate, nor that the employee 
will exert a low effort level. 
This article examines the cooperation of workers. It extends the experimental design of 
Gächter and Falk to include average wage as a focal point so that workers can compare it with 
their own wages. The average wage also provides an idea of relative reciprocal type of the 
employer compared with other employers. Specifically, the average wage creates competition 
among employers; employees can observe the relative reciprocal type of employer if the offered 
wage level is lower than the average wage, before deciding on their effort level. Therefore, 
average wage information plays the role of enforcement device for the worker.
The change to average wage treatment should improve the cooperation between worker 
and employer. In this treatment, low offers are no longer a dominant strategy for worker or 
employer, as it is Pareto-dominated by the higher offer. The average wage serves as a focal 
point for employees to evaluate the type of employer with which they are dealing. Another 
reason is that the worker can be more confident as they can know whether they are being 
treated fairly, based on the comparison between the wage they received and the average wage.
Focal-point hypothesis has been tested in other set-ups. Among the pioneer papers are 
Issac et al. (1989), who tested the hypothesis in a Voluntary contribution Game. In the 
experiment, players can observe the provisional point agreed by players through signalling 
and communication. comparing the contribution between two treatments, contribution in the 
treatment with provisional point is significantly higher than the contribution in the treatment 
without provisional point. In other relevant papers by Kahneman et al. (1986) and Hoffman et 
al. (1994), they employ the observability of the provisional points to invoke equity concerns 
among players in an ultimatum game. Players formed expectation and demand a higher share 
when they believe they have ‘earned the right’.
The cooperation in the gift exchange game is usually tested by partner treatment, in which 
players meet the same partners more than once. The role of relative information mentioned 
above has not been tested. The closest analysis to our paper is by Gächter et al. (2002). In 
their paper, the overall effort levels increase significantly as the players can observe market 
effort. In another paper by charness and Kuhn (2007), it was found that there was a limited 
effect of relative wage on effort level in a random matching treatment. The limited effect may 
be caused by the lack of enforcement from the same employer. This paper analyses the effect 
of average wage in a repeated game because in some industries, the average wage rather than 
market effort is observable.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the experimental designs and 
procedures and also outlines the research expectations. Section III reports the results of the 
three treatments. Section IV concludes the paper. 
II. ExPErIMEnTAL dESIGnS And ProcEdurES
Based on the model in Gächter and Falk (2002), the gift exchange game is a typical sequential 
game with the employer making moves first to offer a wage level to a worker. In the second 
stage, the worker can decide whether to accept or reject the offer. The decisions are known KEAn siAnG, ch’nG
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only to the partners. If the wage is rejected, both players earn zero profit for the round. In 
total there are 10 rounds of interactions. If the worker accepts the offer, he has to decide how 
much to work for the employer.
In the experiment, both players know the profit function of their partner. The profit function 
of the employer is determined by,
€ 
π = (v − w)e  (1)
where ν  refers to some exogenously given value, w is wage offered to a worker and e is effort 
level exerted by the worker.
A worker’s pay-off is the difference between the wage (w) and the incurred effort costs 
c(e), minus the fixed travel cost of 20 unit of experimental money:
€ 
U = w −C(e)−20  (2)
In the experiment, ν  = 120, and wage offer has to be an integer number from 20 to 120 
inclusive. The effort level and the associated costs are exhibited in Table 1.
Table 1: Effort Levels and the Associated costs
Effort (e) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
upon entering the experimental lab, the subjects were assigned randomly to the role of 
‘employer’ and ‘worker’ and each was assigned randomly to a computer cubicle in two separate 
different rooms. The ‘workers’ and the ‘employers’ were then given about 7 minutes to read 
the instructions, which included a set of questions to calculate the pay-off of both worker and 
employer. The experimenter then announced the procedures during the experiment and answered 
the questions raised. The experiment was conducted in an economics experimental lab in the 
School of Social Sciences, universiti Sains Malaysia. The experiment was programmed and 
conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
The three treatments are explained as follows:
1.   Stranger. The subjects were paired randomly with an anonymous partner. Each subject was 
matched with a different partner after each round. At the end of each round the subjects 
were given the information about their pay-off and their partner’s pay-off before proceeding 
to next round.
    This benchmark treatment will be compared with partner treatment to test for repetition 
effect. Since players meet their partners only once, there should be no strategic reason for 
reciprocity. The hypothesis in stranger is that the effort should be at the minimal level 
and the relation between wage and effort is low.
    If the repetition effect played a role, the effort in partner should be significantly 
higher than the effort in stranger, and the relationship between effort and wage should be 
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2.  Partner. Each subject interacted with the same anonymous employer throughout the 
experiment. After making the effort decision, workers were informed of the summary of 
pay-offs.
    This treatment was then compared to partner with average wage to test for assurance 
problem hypothesis. If the hypothesis is true, that workers suffer from assurance problems, 
then effort should be low and the relationship between wage and effort is not significant 
in partner.
    If the source of low effort level is because the worker cannot observe the relative 
reciprocal type of the employer, then workers do not have the confidence to build reputation 
to induce wage by exerting high effort. The reputation hypothesis is tested on the difference 
of effort level between periods 1 and 5 and periods 6 and 0. If workers do not establish 
their reputation, the effort level between these two periods is not significantly different.
3.   Partner with average wage. The treatment was similar to partner, but with average wage 
information. The treatment allowed workers to compare wages received with the average 
wage.
    Workers in this treatment can evaluate the relative reciprocal type of employers based 
on the difference between wage offered and average wage. It is expected that workers 
reciprocate to wage rent (i.e., wage(t) – average wage (t-1)) more than the current wage, 
and effort should be higher when wage rent is positive than when wage rent is negative.
    The reciprocity of the workers causes employers to take into account the average 
wage when deciding on current wages offered. To elicit cooperation from the workers, 
employers will have to respond to the average wage by offering a current wage which is 
close to the average wage.
A total of 112 undergraduate students from universiti Sains Malaysia participated in the 
experiment: 42 in stranger; 48 in partner; and 22 in partner with average wage. The subjects 
came from different backgrounds: Economics, Psychology, chemistry, Biology, Management 
and Political Science. All the subjects had never participated in any experiments before.
At the beginning of each treatment, subjects were told that they would participate in an 
economic experiment in which they had to decide how much effort and wages to offer to an 
anonymous partner. Subjects in all the treatments could not know the type of partner assigned, 
as matching was done randomly by the computer and they were not allowed to communicate 
during the experiment. Subjects in the partner with average wage treatment were told that the 
average wage was the sum of all the wages offered by the employers divided by the number 
of employers, and this was observable to all subjects.
III. ExPErIMEnTAL rESuLTS
Figure 1 illustrates the data from the three different treatments for all ten periods. The left 
vertical axis represents the various effort levels, and the right vertical axis represents the wage 
levels. The dots in the figure are the different effort levels exerted by workers. The first long 
dotted line represents the average wage, and the second dotted line represents the average 
effort level.KEAn siAnG, ch’nG
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Figure 1: response of Workers to Wages in different Treatments
(a) response of workers in Stranger
(b) response of workers in Partner
(c) response of workers in Partner with average wage
 
 
comparing stranger and partner, the difference in effort is not statistically significant 
(p=0.5820, T-test). The average effort level in partner with average wage is significantly 
different from partner (p=0.0000). Efforts in both stranger and partner are static in the 0.3 to 
0.35 range and do not respond to different wage levels. 
The wage levels in stranger and partner are susceptible to fluctuation. repetition effect 
does not improve the cooperation rate of employer with higher wage levels. The wage levels rolE of rElAtiVE informAtion And rEciProcity in A Gift ExchAnGE GAmE: An ExPErimEntAl study
104
fluctuate around the 50 to 60 range in partner, compared to the 40 to 90 range in partner with 
average wage. In the latter treatment, the increasing pattern in wage suggests positive relation 
between wage and effort.
More detail observations for each treatment are as follows:
Observation 1: The absence of relative information causes workers to not reciprocate. 
Treatment of stranger. When workers and employers only meet once, there is no strategic 
reason to reciprocate. The effort levels appear to be static across all periods, irrespective of 
various levels of wage offered by employers. Spearman rank correlation between wage and 
effort reveals the relation is positive at 0.5015 (p=0.0000).
Treatment of partner. In the repeated play, workers are not assured that the wage offered is 
‘really’ commensurate with the effort exerted, as workers cannot compare it with other wages. 
The correlation coefficient is 0.5404 and statistically significant (p=0.0000).
Treatment of partner with average wage. When average wage is observable to the workers, 
it provides a focal point so workers can compare it with the wage offered. 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient reveals the relation between wage rent (own wage 
(t) – average wage (t-1)) and effort is 0.6432 (p=0.0000) whereby nine workers reciprocate 
to wage rent with significance level being less than 5%. The relation between current wage 
and effort is 0.4555 (p=0.0000). This shows that workers react to average wage more than to 
current wage.
The presence of the average wage eliminates the assurance problem of the workers as 
employers take into account the average wage when deciding on current wages. Simple 
ordinary Least Square regression reveals that  1 t w +  is related positively to average wage (t), 
with regression coefficient of 0.8972 (p=0.0000) in Partner with average wage and -0.3609 
(p=0.317) in Partner treatment.




Observation 2: observability of relative employer type through average wage encourages 
workers to offer high effort.
Wage difference is calculated as  1 − − = ∆ t t w w w . Figure 2 shows the average effort in 
different ranges of  w ∆ . The Wilcoxon Sign rank test reveals the average effort when ∆w∈ [0;30] 
and when ∆w∈ [31;100] is not significantly different in partner treatment (p=0.3841) or in 
stranger treatment (p=0.1616). In the partner with average wage treatment, the average effort 
when wage rent is positive (i.e., e=0.6016) is significantly different from effort when wage 
rent is negative (i.e., e=0.342) (p=0.0000).
Observation 3: The level of average wage affects the cooperation decision.
Table 2 reports individual decisions by treatment. It is observed that the number of high effort 
workers does not increase from stranger to partner treatment, at 18% and 19% respectively. 
With partner with average wage, there is a large decrease in the incidence of low effort and 
a dramatic increase in high effort.
Table 2: Summary of number of Effort Levels According to Treatments
Stranger Partner Partner with 
average wage
0 <e <0.3 (low) 109 0.51 119 0.49 26 0.23
0.3 <e <0.6 (medium) 63 0.31 74 0.30 44 0.40
0.6 <   (high) 38 0.18 27 0.19 40 0.36
notes: 
‘e’ represents effort
The number on the left hand side of each column represents frequency and the percentage on the right.
Observation 4: The assurance reduces tendency to build reputation.
According to Kreps et al. (1982) and Andreoni and Miller (1993), in a finitely repeated 
interaction and when the partner type is not known, a rational player has the incentive to play 
cooperatively in the initial few rounds to build up a cooperative reputation, and will defect 
to low cooperation later.
Figure 3 shows the effort data for the three treatments. In partner, the effort levels in 
periods 1–5 is 0.34 and in periods 6–10 is 0.32, and the difference is statistically significant 
below the 10% level (p=0.0672). In partner with average wage, average effort from periods 
1–5 is 0.3945 and in periods 6–10 is 0.5727. These findings support the reputation hypothesis 
that in partner, when employer’s relative type is not known, workers have an incentive to 
build cooperative reputation. But when the relative reputation is known, through comparison 
between current wage and average wage in the treatment partner with average wage, workers 
do not have to build such a reputation.rolE of rElAtiVE informAtion And rEciProcity in A Gift ExchAnGE GAmE: An ExPErimEntAl study
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Figure 3: The Average Effort for the Three Different Treatments
(c) Effort behaviour in Partner with average wage
(b) Effort behaviour in Partner






Three experimental treatments were conducted to test the role of repetition and average wage 
in a typical Gift Exchange Game. under the repetition environment, workers did not behave 
differently from stranger treatment when workers and firms only met once. It was demonstrated 
that low effort levels exerted in partner was because the workers could not identify the relative 
type of employer they were dealing with. This caused the workers to not respond to the wages 
offered by employers. The problem was eradicated in the third treatment when workers could 
compare their own wage with average wage. The average wage provided a focal point for 
workers to judge current wage, and also gave an idea of the relative reciprocal type of employer 
compared to other employers. In this environment, workers were more confident in offering 
a high effort level. Workers responded to wage rent more than current wage when deciding 
on effort level. 
The observability of the relative reciprocal type of the employers exerted ‘pressure’ on 
employers to offer a wage which was close to the average wage. The revelation of average 
wage information created competition among employers to elicit effort level from workers.
one practical implication is that the revelation of the average wage provides a benchmark for 
wage offers. The information creates an incentive for workers to evaluate and seek a generous 
employer. To attract effort, the wage offer will have to be determined by the external market. 
If the effort is not perfectly observable in an organization where the ownership is separated 
by control, this results in increased wages, which are not paralleled by higher effort. 
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